last, and in a separate paragraph. After he fulfils the rigorous intellectual and moral criteria, the ideal poet's "labour is not yet at an end: he must know many languages and sciences; and, that his stile may be worthy of his thoughts, must, by incessant practice, familiarize to himself every delicacy of speech and grace of harmony." Even here, in a general description of technical prowess, the plea is for demonstrated power of mind and moral rigour in the writer and in his productions. In fact, Johnson's demand is especially clear-cut when he scrutinizes achievement in versification, where his vocabulary of praise and blame helps him to pass judgment by reference to psychological effects On the mind of the reader. For instance, Imlac's key word is "harmony," a term which has direct reference to a body of Johnsonian opinion on the "morality of prosody." Fussell points out that, in Johnson's belief, "prosodic regularity forces the ordering of the perceiver's mind sO that it may be in a condition to receive the ordered moral matter of the poem, just as, in ethics and religion, a conscious regularizing of principles and even of daily habits is the necessary condition for the growth of piety.'" Thus "harmony," as it is defined in one of a series of Ramblers on Milton's versification, IS closely linked with the power of verses to regulate the passions:
However minute the employment may appear, and whatever ridicule may be incurred by a solemn deliberation upon accents and pauses, it is certain that without this petty knowledge no man can be a poet; and that from the proper disposition of single sounds results that harmony that adds force to reason, and gives grace to sublimity; that shackles attention, and governs passions. a Milton's versification in Paradise Lost is considered "offensive" because in his accents and pauses the poet "seems to have somewhat mistaken the nature of our language ... the abscission of a vowel is undoubtedly vicious when it is strongly sounded." Similarly, certain lines of Lycidas are vicious because "the diction is harsh, the rhymes uncertain, and the numbers unpleasing"; and the same principle, operating in Johnson's comments on diction in blank verse and odes, usually results in an unfavourable judgment. Prosodic "irregularity" wherever found is generally censured as an evasion of the moral office of poetry.
((Harsh," 'Irugged," Ilweak," "gross," "irregular," "little," flpretty"-for Johnson such negative terms suggest reasons why a man is not fit for greatness. The terms of praise-Hsmooth," 'Ipleasing," "combination," " h " I I •
strengt J VIgour, WIt In t e sense 0 IDte eetlOn , ease, SUlimity," "elegance"-work toward the exposition of "a vigorous genius operating upon large materials" and penetrating to "the recesses of the mind." We are reminded of Coleridge, who once said he put more meaning in his words than most people; for Johnson, using a fairly restricted set of critical terms, with fixed meanings, manages to maintain a remarkably flexible approach. The terms which describe positive value are of interest, for taken together they suggest what greatness was for
Johnson. A few of the most weighty of these words may be chosen as a move toward reconstituting the ideal poet as Johnson conceived him. The word "strength" occurs frequently in eighteenth-century critical discussions of the language of poetry. It refers primarily to the tradition of "the strength of Denham." Pope, for instance, exhorts his readers to "praise the easy vigour of a line / Where Denham's strength and Waller's sweetness join." Yet "strength" in the criticism of Johnson's century has nothing to do with ardour or emotional pressure; it goes, as Donald Davie states, with "sense":
It is significant that Iistrong feelings" is still a normal expression in modern English, where "strong sense" is not. That in itself suggests that we are dealing with something for which the name has been lost. So, too, perhaps has the relish for it, the capacity for enjoying or even for perceiving it.' It would appear that the eighteenth century believed "strong sense" was the ability to crowd much meaning into a short space; it means, as Davie says, "close and compact syntax, neither more nor less." This explains Johnson's remark on Cowley, recorded by Boswell in the Tour to the Hebrides: 'There is more sense in a line of Cowley, than in a page (or a sentence, or ten lines,-I am not quite certain of the very phrase) of Pope.'" Pope's more diffuse style is again censured, in a comparison with Sir Richard Blackmore's poem Creation: To reason in verse is allowed to be difficult; but Blackmore not only reasons in verse, but very often reasons poetically, and finds the art of uniting ornament with strength, and ease with closeness. This is a skill which Pope might have condescended to learn from him, when he needed it so much in his Moral Essays." "Closeness" and "strength" are here the elements of poetical ratiocination. They make for compression, a logical purity of diction and argument. And perhaps they offer a justification for the whole venture of poetry in a rational age by describing couplets as more compact, more intense than prose yet having the virtues of prose.
Usually, as in the passage above from the "Life of Blackmore," "strength" in this sense finds a supplement in the notion of "ease." To this concept the whole of Idler, no. 77 is devoted: Cowley seems to have possessed the power of writing easily beyond any other of our poets .... The poets, from the time of Dryden, have gradually advanced in embellishment, and consequently departed from simplicity and ease . . .. To require from any author many pieces of easy poetry, would be indeed to oppress him with too hard a task. It is less difficult to write a volume of lines swelled with epithets, brightened by figures, and stiffened by transpositions, than to produce a few couplets graced only by naked elegance and simple purity, which require so much care and skill, that I doubt whether any of our authors have yet been able, for twenty lines together, nicely to observe the true definition of easy poetry.
"Ease," as the beginning of this Idler states, is naturalness of diction. It means carrying thought into language without wrenching it by "transpositions," inversions, falsified epithets, padding, or "tumor of phrase." In noting the incapacity of post-Augustan writers to "produce a few couplets graced only by naked elegance and simple purity," Johnson seems to imply that contemporary poets have lost some of the intelligence and patience of earlier writers. He wants poetry to be as transparent to meaning as possible, preferring sense rather than embellishment. For instance, some of his impatience at the straining and labouring of recent poetry is expressed on the last page of the Lives of the Poets when he dismisses the odes of Thomas Gray:
These odes are marked by glittering accumulations of ungraceful ornaments; they strike rather than please; the images are magnified by affectation; the language is laboured into harshness. The mind of the writer seems to work with unnatural violence. "Double, double, toil and trouble." He has a kind of strutting dignity, and is tall by walking on tiptoe. His art and his struggle are too visible, and there is too little appearance of ease and nature.
It is an unanswerable judgment-partly because of its humour and conviction of truth, but also because of a curiously speCific critical terminology which focuses exactly on Gray's deficiencies.
II
The opposite of a "harsh" style would be "sweet," "smooth," "elegant."
Johnson's adjectives suggest the importance in his criticism of "Waller's sweetness"; in addition to being "strong," poetry must be civilized, intelligible. In the "Life of Waller," he notes:
The general character of his poetry is elegance and gaiety. He is never pathetic, and very rarely sublime .... He added something to our elegance of diction, and something to our propriety of thought. 7 With his Howing couplets Waller helped to banish "roughness" and "irregularity"; yet he also banished thereby all claims to sublimity. Often, Johnson uses the word "elegant" with the full burden of this historical recognition. For example Pope in his version of the Iliad is said to have "tuned the English tongue":
... for since its appearance no writer, however deficient in other powers, has wanted melody. Such a series of lines, so elaborately corrected and so sweetly modulated, took possession of the public ear .... Elegance is surely to be desired, if it be not gained at the expense of dignity.
But the price, Johnson knew, must always and inevitably be paid:
Pope wrote for his own age and his own nation; he knew that it was necessary to colour the images and point the sentiments of his author; he therefore made him graceful, but lost him some of his sublimity .
• Elegance "elaborately corrected" Johnson finds justifiable; but he elsewhere notes how elegance can be pushed too far, describing the writer hungry for fame who, "as he grows more elegant, becomes less intelligible." In Idler, nO. 36, he exposes an extreme instance in the "bugbear style" of James Petvin's inHated Letters Concerning Mind (1750), a book containing "nothing more than very plain truths, which till this Author arose, had always been delivered in plain language." The point is "not to move by wheels and levers what will give way to the naked hand," for clarity and plainness are "the great proof of a healthful and
When, in the Lives of the Poets, Johnson makes similar remarks on language-on the over-use of hyperbole, the degeneration of metaphor, the lapse of simile to mere "exemplification"-the historical comparison between present and previous writers is only implied. We may speculate that he has a general sense of the decline of "strength," "ease," and "sublimity" in literary style and perhaps too in the positive virtues these terms imply for the temper of moral life. But he nowhere makes this fully explicit and we are left only detached utterances in his practical criticism, as in the sense of a falling-off implied by his eulogy of the powerful, impetuous metaphysical intellection of Cowley in the first of the Lives, and his censure of Gray in the last. Johnson stated once in conversation that there is "more thinking in Milton and in Butler than in any of our poets."· He delighted in the "poetical ratiocination" which was lithe favourite exercise" of Dryden's mind, a mind livery comprehensive by nature, and much enriched with acquired knowledge."'· Boswell records that Johnson's superiority over ordinary learned men "consisted chieHy in ... the art of thinking, the art of using his mind."" This was what he looked for and often found wanting in others and in the writers who came under his observation.
Hence the most important attribute of the metaphysical poets was their ability to think. Searching for manliness of mind, Johnson returns to the seventeenth-century definition of wit as "intellection, in contradistinction to will,"" in order to understand and explain Cowley and the metaphysical poets. He is attempting to understand these poets by first combatting Pope's merely ornamentalist idea of wit-"that which has been often thought, but was never before so well expressed"-as one which "reduces it from strength of thought to happiness of language." Then, finding he cannot accommodate these poets by a loose definition of wit as that "which is at once natural and new," he offers a final and more satisfactory definition:
Wit, abstracted from its effects upon the hearer, may be more rigorously and philosophically considered as a kind of discordia concors; a combination of dissimilar images, or discovery of occult resemblances in things apparently unlike. Of wit, thus defined, they have more than enough." Though Johnson does often enough oppose reaSOn to imagination, though he does use the popular ornamentalist terminology, perhaps nevertheless we intuit what was most central in his conception of poetic language when we fix upon this power of thinking-into, combination, the ability of the poetic mind-and the mind of the reader-to synthesize, to relate the dissimilar. He is here celebrating the power of rational imagina· tion; he is looking for reason and passion which energize one another. In the "Life of Roscommon," he says, with the same import, that it is "ridiculous to oppose reason to imagination" in poetry. This quality of the active mind at work-"wit" in his Dictionary definition of "the power of the mind"-was certainly what he missed in much of the poetry of his own century, particularly in the writers who were coming to supplant the Augustans. Yet it was, for him, one of the primary qualities of the great poet. We may tentatively deduce that Johnson means by "thinking" the union of strong reason with quick sensibility. Imagination is "useless without knowledge" and "nature gives in vain the power of combination, unless study and observation supply materials to be combined."14 Reason and learning temper the combining force of imagination and provide it with roughage: "Knowledge of the subject is to the poet what durable materials are to the architect."H~ "Wit" and ucombination," so defined, are thus part of Johnson's comprehensive desire for an originality which builds with elements previously known, uniting images and emphases with the force of truth. Shakespeare's handling of character, language, and stagecraft was so overwhelmingly novel yet valid that Johnson can claim, in the Preface to his edition, "we owe everything to him." Since "the highest praise of genius is original invention," Denham's "new scheme of poetry" in Cooper's Hill Ca species . .. that may be denominated local poetry") wins for him "the rank and dignity of an original author"; John Philips' The Splendid Shilling has the "uncommon merit of an original design"; and Con greve, has "merit of the highest kind; he is an original writer, who borrowed neither the models of his plot, nor the manner of his dialogue." In such comments, often given to soften an otherwise destructive judgment, the whole of Johnson's ethical thinking on the force of novelty is engaged. He wants for poetry the greatness which-without losing its humanity-moves on with courage further than the previous forms and entrenchments. "Goed sense alone is a sedate and quiescent quality," according to Johnson; but Pope had likewise genius; a mind active, ambitious, and adventurous, always investigating, always aspiring; in its widest searches still longing to go forward, in its highest flights still wishing to be higher; always imagining something greater than it kn ows, always endeavouring more than it can doY~ Pope's "originality," pushing on further than the prudential, is seen to be ethical as well as literary in character, a strenuous and imaginative morality in life and literature.
Wherever possible Johnson praises feats of literary "capaciousness" or amplitude, a quality inseparable from "genius" and "originality" in a writer, and one usually related mOre to choice of genre than to choice of language. Much as he is proud of ",riting which comes after the refinement of English versification in the couplet technique (which after Dryden will have no chance to "relapse to its former savageness"), Johnson yet longs for the greater genres of the previous century. In the "Drury Lane Prologue" (J 747), he describes the decline of tragedy from Lear and Hamlet to the modern "Pantomime, and Song": Addison's play, which adheres to the unities and does nOt mingle Tragedy and Comedy, is yet frigid and hardly playable, "a garden accurately fonned and diligently planted" to Shakespeare's uncut forest Again, with excellence in the larger genres in mind, the epic design 01
Paradise Lost is "so comprehensive that it could be justified only b) success." Johnson, describing the events and persons, uses the charac teristic word: "Before the greatness displayed in Milton's poem, all othel greamess shrinks away."" Most of the passing judgments against specific works in the Lives art made almost mechanically, and derive from a disdain for pastoral, mythological, or deSCriptive poems, love poems, and odes-poems most often in lesser genres, which could engage only a part of the mind. But "the first praise of genius is due to the writer of an epic poem , as it requires an assemblage of all the powers which are Singly sufficient for other com· posi. tions."18 Johns.on loves a writer's "appetite for greatness." In his praise for intensity of tragic passion, and largeness of epic conception, he is reactionary and all but subversive; for it is as if he looked back, over the heads of several generations, to find the scope and penetration he wanted. The quality of this longing for the capacious, in its mixture with a curious irony directed at himself and his age, is perhaps summed up in a single apophthegm fiom Hawkins' edition of Johnson's works :
He thought Cala the best model tragedy we had; yet he used to say, of all things, " , the most ridiculous would be, to see a girl cry at the representation of it.IS ill Johnson refers everything to the human mind as the register and possessor of human greatness. It is perhaps his most important way of describing, in a single locution, the moral and literary aspects of the same human situation. His use of "the mind" encompasses all the discrete psychological faculties, and suggests always the dignity of human reason. One of his most constapt wishes is that the mind should not grow "stagnant"-it should cultivate "vehemence and activity" because these are "always hastening toward their own reformation,"2O and if the mind settles too long it narrows and turns inward. Wherever he can, Johnson combats the "bugbear" which would allow people to escape the labour of earning excellence by the "opinion that every kind of knowledge requires a particular genius, or mental constitution , framed for the per· ception of some ideas, and the exclusion of others."'1 The true genius is "a mind of large generar powers, aCcidentally detemlined to some particular direction ,"" superb in his specialty but above all humanly superb.
The capacious mind has delight in sheer exercise of power and it will always be extravagantly larger than is required for any particular task:
He said he could not understand how a man could apply to one thing and not to another. Robertson said one man had more judgment, another more imagination. JOHNSON . "No, sir; it is only one man has more mind than another.
He may direct it differently; he may hy accident see the success of one kind of study and take a desire to excel in it. I am persuaded that had Sir Isaac Newton applied to poetry, he would have made a very fine epic poem. I could as easily apply to law as to tragic poetry?' H ere as elsewhere the large minds move naturally to tragic and epic as the most Significant genres. The quantitative and the qualitative are fused, in the phrase "more mind," and Johnson admits there are degrees of excellence. He says elsewhere that all human excellence is comparative and that "every man pants for the highest eminence within his view."" Johnson took his own text from Luke XII, 48: "Of him, to whom much is given, much shall be required"; and Boswell notes that this text "seems to have been ever present to his mind, in a rigorous sense, and to have made him dissatisfied with his labours and acts of goodness, however comparatively great; so that the unavoidable consciousness of his superiority was, in that respect, a cause for disquiet." Mrs. Thrale, on this same point, remembers that Johnson, "reasonable with regard to others, ... had formed vain hopes of performing impossibilities himself."" Without a doubt Imlac's list of impossibilities for the ideal poet is to some extent a deSCription of the moral and literary hurdles Johnson was setting for himself.
Johnson feels excellence must be emulated and attempted. There is a need to continue or revive "the names of those whose extensive abilities have dignified mankind." This is the point of Adventurer, no. 81, which includes a brief biography of the Admirable Crichton, a man variously successful in arms and learning who seems virtuous enough to be "exalted above the common rate of humanity." The reason for including this exemplary life, and for the references elsewhere to Socrates and Erasmus, is that "from torpid despondency can come no advantage"-that ''honest emulation" is necessary, and salutary :
Every man should . . . endeavour to maintain in himself a favourable opinion of the powers of the human mind; which are perhaps, in every man, greater than they appear, and might, hy dilligent cultivation, he exalted to a degree beyond what their possessor presumes to be1ieve. There is scarce any man but has found himself ahle, at the instigation of necessity, to do what in a state of leisure and deliberation he would have concluded impossible; and some of our species have signalized themselves by such achievements, as prove that there are few things above human hope.'" This accounts for Johnson's persisteJ;lt interest in biography, which even more than fiction gives us what comes near to ourselves and "enchain[sl the heart by irresistible interest." In the brilliant Rambler, no. 60, Johnson explains how in biography an empathic "act of the imagination" places us "for a time ... in the condition of him whose fortune we emulate" and "our passions are .. . more strongly moved, in proportion as we can more readily adopt the pains or pleasure proposed to our minds, by recognizing them as once our own, or considering them as naturally incident to our state of life." Biography gives us a sense of familiarity with great men and so heartens us to emulation, as neither our sense of familiarity nor the eminence of great men would do by themselves.
Begun as biography, the Li1les of the Poets turns into criticism when Johnson, as he notes in the "Advertisement," is "led beyond my intention," The movement, given Johnson's assumptions, is characteristic and natural. There are few explicit connections made between any author's character and his writing, yet there are gaps of thought which can be leaped and we can come fairly close to what Johnson thought of the inter-relations. A single sentence, for instance, gives by indirection the whole story about Jonathan Swift: "To his domestics he was naturally rough; and a man of a rigorous temper, with that vigilance of minute attention which his works discover, must have been a master that few could bear." The poems of the Earl of Rochester, who according to Johnson "lived worthless and useless, and blazed out his youth," lack the preparation of a "course of continued study" and are "commonly short, such as one fit of resolution would produce." And the "Life of William Collins," a poet whom Johnson had known in London, rises to compassionate general statements which yet remain stubbornly anchored in the events, and the hopes, of Collins' life:
He planned several tragedies, but he only planned them.
He loved fairies, genii, giants, and monsters; he delighted to rove through the meanders of enchantment, to gaze on the magnificence of golden palaces, to repose by the waterfalls of Elysian gardens.
Johnson implicitly connects the poetical fancies of Collins-"this idea which he had formed of excellence led him to Oriental fictions and allegorical imagery"-with the poet's later insanity. Also in the Li1les
Johnson rarely fails to describe a writer's conversation. It is one way of getting a purchase on the quality of the mind he is dealing with; he wants to see how much of the man is present outside his writing, how much part the writer takes in social behaviour, how much he is able to give, and to take, of knowledge in this eminently human way.
In describing moral or human excellence perhaps the greater part of Johnson's observation and description works negatively, by pOinting out narrowness, meanness, partiality. Analogously, in literature, triaes "always require exuberance of ornament"; for like Shakespeare's "quibbles" they tend to exist for their own sake, leading away from the required strength, ease, and sublimity. Thus those poems which are "pretty" or "little," like Waller's lyrics, or misbegotten like the poem upon Nothing by Rochester, or "lavished on fugitive topics" like Butler's Hudibras, have very little we can apply immediately to life. The eighteenth-century imitators-those, for example, like John Philips, who contrived to copy only Milton's "asperities," or Nicholas Rowe, whose Jane Shore (1714) is "remote in the utmost degree from the manner of Shakespeare"-deserve the same judgment as Matthew Prior, whose Solomon imitates Hudibras: "The spangles of wit which he could afford, he knew how to polish ; but he wanted the bullion of his master." There is a slight withdrawal, too, from Pope's profeSSional intensity : from youth his "primary purpose was to be a poet." Johnson appears to select this piece of information and some others, like his remark on the artifice and "narrowness of mind" in Pope's ambitious letters, so that he may underline a deep suspicion that Pope was wrong-that his "primary purpose" should have been to be a man .
One's sense is of a man fascinated with greatness. We have the curve of a career which shows Johnson-consciously or not-straining towards an increaSingly more comprehensive excellence, and testing himself against great authors at the same time he was making them available to others. The attempt is the human one, heroically intensified, to stretch the mind by contact and empathy, and to learn to be less partial. Yet Johnson sees the traps and pitfalls of any such programme of individual development. From very early on he is concerned, for example, with the psychological effects of models which are "really and naturally great"; to deal with such men "is a task not only difficult but disagreeable; because the writer is degraded in his Own eyes, by standing in comparison with his subject, to which he can hope to add nothing from his imagination."27 At the outset of the Ramblers on Milton's versification, the whole process finds a metaphor in plant growth: It is ... always dangerous to be placed in a state of unavoidable comparison with excellence, and the danger is still greater when that excellence is consecrated by death .... He that succeeds a celebrated writer, has the same diffi· culties to encounter; he stands under the shade of exalted merit, and is hindered from rising to his natural height, by the interception of the beams which should invigorate and quicken him.'s In beginning the Shakespeare Preface he notes similarly the "prescriptive veneration" which makes the achievement of a previous age or writer seem absolute.
Johnson's own reaction to great writers is like the frank response of a peer; he displays no excessive reverence, yet he is reluctant to condemn. His generosity is perhaps most pronounced in the "Life of Milton" where his dislike of Milton the man and the politician does not hinder his full appreciation of the works. Paradise Lost would be expected to run into Johnson's preference for couplets; yet, meeting with assured epic stature, he transcends all stock responses: "I cannot wish his work to be other than it is." In a rather similar way he discusses the metaphysical poets with a retrospective concept of "wit" which works against the tendencies of his century. Shakespeare, Milton, Dryden, and Pope receive ultimate praise as poets, not for their language, but for their "minds," for the heightening of humanity they can grasp and express. When in the Lives Johnson discusses lesser writers, most often he relies on received ideas of "correctness"; but when he deals with the major figures he is often content to relax his scruples and praise. In his criticism, as in his ethical writing, he is looking for the most humanly inclusive response to the complexities of living-whether or not, within reason, it evades or denies the rules. 11,254. 
